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FERMENT
in the
LAAGER
In the heady events of 1990, the ANC's cessation of the 
guerilla war in August passed almost without comment. 
Apartheid now seems on its last legs. 
Norman Etherington traces the rapid fall 
of yet another one-party state.
hen a single party state approaches its 
death throes, conventional political 
analysis offers few clues to the even­
tual outcome. Last year's convulsions 
in Eastern Europe provide one demonstration of 
that axiom. This year's upheavals in South Africa 
provide another.
Anyone who tried to read the auguries by looking to 
South African laws and the manifestos of the formal 
and informal political groupings can as easily go astray 
as those who confidently predicted in 1989 that East 
Germ any and Czechoslovakia would stand fast as 
Poland and Hungary transformed themselves. Last 
year's leadership, last year's parties, last year's legal 
and constitutional verities have disappeared in a puff 
of smoke. W ise heads misread Eastern Europe by 
paying too much attention to formal politics and too 
little to external pressures and economic imperatives.
Any analysis of the current political situation in South 
Africa must avoid that mistake. As President de Klerk 
and citizen M andela edge towards concocting an 
agreed agenda for change, they are driven less by an­
cient credos than by crises in the material bases of the 
movements they lead.
Both the enemies and the friends of the National Party 
dictatorship are prone to accept unquestionably the 
premise that South Africa is the economic powerhouse- 
of Africa, an engine that will chug smoothly ahead once 
again when the current troubles have been surmounted
- either by the emergence of an ANC government, or the 
recasting of apartheid into a kinder and gentler mode. 
Those who have watched the economy more closely 
have been saying for years that it is very sick and its 
recovery is by no means certain. The sickness is trace­
able to the same viruses that have affected all formerly 
closed economies in the m odem  era of rapid interna­
tional capital movements. Viewed from a southern 
Pacific perspective, South Africa faces the crisis ex­
perienced by Australia and New Zealand, but in a much 
more critical form. Viewed from a northern Atlantic 
p ersp ectiv e , South A frica 's  tro u b les b ear m any 
similarities to those of Eastern Europe.
To be brief, the South African economy is reeling under 
irresistible external pressures which forced the transi­
tion from a state-driven economy to an open one. The
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economic downturn of the later 70s caught the republic 
off guard, geared as it has been to steady, even spec­
tacular, growth since the early 60s. Suddenly there was 
inflation, rising interest rates, a sharp drop in the 
profitability of manufacturing industry, and an upward
bending curve of foreign debt which compared un­
favourably even with embattled countries such as Zaire 
and Chile. To meet the threat the state turned to 
fashionable m onetarist rem edies prescribed by the 
Chicago school - tightening credit, cutting government
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spending, and taking measures to stem the outflow of 
capital - which inadvertently plunged the economy 
sharply into recession in 1981. Companies began to go 
bankrupt. Others retrenched workers on a massive 
scale. The resulting unemployment in a country which 
had long  m aintained  a reserve arm y o f the un­
employed, raised joblessness to critical levels. Accord­
in g  to e co n o m ist Fu ad  C assim , it w as not 
w ell-in ten tion ed  p o litica l reform  but m onetarist 
economic reform that ignited the explosion of discon­
tent in the townships.
Against this background of deflationary policies, it be­
comes easier to understand why the Vaal Triangle 
eru p ted  in  Se p tem b e r 1984 and  u n rest spread  
throughout the country. Political 'ungovernability' 
was, in fact, preceded by economic mismanagement or, 
rather, a lack of management and guidance. On 20 July 
1985 the government declared a state of emergency and, 
as investors began switching funds out of South Africa, 
imposed a debt freeze and a two-tier exchange rate. At 
the same time, resistance in the country reached a new 
stage.
Why did measures which produced the desired results 
in other countries w reak havoc in South Africa? 
Monetarist theory said that balance of payments and 
trade problems could be counteracted by devaluing the 
currency (thus boosting exports and curbing imports) 
and reducing the cost content of exports by cutting real 
wages. Inflation was supposed to be kept in check by 
curbing the money supply and raising interest rates. 
The economy was then supposed to be restructured to 
produce the exports which would enable economic 
growth to generate the new jobs required by an expand­
ing population. The historic legacy of apartheid, how­
ever, led to quite different results. A slump in the value 
of the currency in a country heavily dependent on 
imports enhanced rather than inhibited inflation. It was 
one thing for Reagan and Thatcher to double un­
employment figures from 5% to 10%. It was quite a 
different thing to double unemployment in a country 
which normally had twice that proportion of people out 
of work. Real wages could not be cut effectively in an 
economy where remuneration hovered near subsis­
tence levels for m ost w orkers. And workers who 
managed to maintain their wage levels were slugged by 
dramatic increases in the cost of living.
Worse still, when unemployed youth took to the streets 
and people boycotted rent payments, international 
financiers - who generally smile when austere economic 
regimes tighten the belts of the workers - took fright and 
the credit-worthiness of the state collapsed. Although 
the manufacturing industry had come to play a much 
larger part in the economy during the previous 30 years, 
it produced mainly for the limited internal market. Its 
goods could not and did not compete on the interna­
tional scene. The im poverished m asses could not 
generate enough local demand to stimulate increases in 
output, and the im port capacity of neighbouring
countries had been deliberately undermined by South 
A fr ic a 's  n o to rio u sly  e ffe c tiv e  ca m p a ig n s of 
'destabilisation'. As Cassim puts it, "the costs of main­
taining the racial order have come home to roost''. The 
80s, which have not been easy for other traditional 
commodity exporters such as New Zealand, Argentina 
and Australia, have been disastrous for South Africa. As 
long as the state of emergency lasts there is no hope of 
the country paying for the importation of the new tech­
nology needed by any country hoping to join the 
winners' circle of countries w hich export finished 
goods to the world. Enough whites fear for the future 
of their capital and their lifestyles to cause them to 
follow de Klerk into unknown territory. W hile the bot­
tom layer of white rural and urban workers see the 
abyss opening beneath their feet and are consequently 
tempted by rightwing movements, the more comfort­
able white suburbanites maintain sufficient faith in the 
National Party to steady the president's nerve.
An additional factor hurrying de Klerk towards real 
change is the removal of external support following the 
withdrawal of the superpowers from African affairs. 
During the Nixon years Henry Kissinger backed South 
Africa against Soviet surrogates. South Africa's cam­
paigns of destabilisation against the 'front-line states' 
were reinforced by covert and overt US aid to America's 
favourite terrorist movements from Angola to Ethiopia. 
Now the Bush presidency is pulling the plug on those 
movements as quickly as the diehard congressional 
reactionaries will allow. Of all the former American 
darlings, only Joseph Savimbi's UNITA movement in 
Angola soldiers on with adequate backing.
The threat of the superpowers is not just bad news for 
white supremacy. All the key black political move­
ments have previously relied heavily on external back­
ing, which is now being progressively withdrawn.
This is often not sufficiently appreciated by external 
observers who tend to take at face value the ideological 
programs proclaimed by those movements. For ex­
ample, the manoeuvres of the Pan African Congress 
(PAC) are better understood in relation to the needs of 
its overseas backers (the governments of Nigeria, Zim­
babwe, Britain and the USA) than by reference to quar­
rels of the early 60s when the PAC could pose with some 
cred ibility  as a leftw ing altern ative to the more 
moderate ANC. During the violent confrontations of 
the past nine months, the PAC has been either invisible 
in the townships or acting in cahoots with corrupt local 
authorities and vigilante gangs. Britain, America and 
Zimbabwe are said to have been pressuring the ANC to 
reach an accord with the PAC but, under the cir­
cumstances, the ANC has no reason to make any over­
tures towards what appears to be a dying political 
movement.
That is not to say that the ANC does not have to worry 
about its material base. It, too, faces a looming crisis of
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external funding that makes Mandela as anxious as de 
Klerk to win through to a negotiated settlement.
As befits a broad-based movement, the ANC has en­
joyed a very wide range of outside aid. W hile the armed 
struggle has depended vitally on Soviet hardware, the 
Scandinavian countries and philanthropic organisa­
tions such as the World Council of Churches have 
propped up ANC offices around the world.
It now seems likely that all military aid from Eastern 
sources will cease in the very near future. This gives the 
ANC a powerful incentive to wind up its guerilla wing, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe. However, the lesson of Zim­
babwe is that mass support flows to the leaders who are 
seen to be fighting. In the last days of the Smith regime, 
every politician from Sithole to Muzorewa who gained 
white support by renouncing violence, lost a commen­
surate amount of black support. Many commentators 
were puzzled when Mandela failed to take the bait of 
several million dollars offered by the US Congress 
during his visit in July. To take the money he had to 
renounce the armed struggle. But by renouncing force 
he would have alienated the townships. Although the 
ANC could not hope to overthrow the regime with 
military force - even if supplies continued - its fighters 
in the bush have a vital symbolic importance.
Support in the townships is more important than any 
amount of external aid. It is the ANC's strength in the 
townships, not its ideological agenda, that has forced 
de Klerk to front up to direct negotiations. The white 
minority regime would have preferred to deal with 
ethnic leaders such as Magosutho Buthelezi of Kwa 
Zulu. Events have moved so quickly, however, that 
Buthelezi is fighting hard to preserve a hope of playing 
even a minor part in the negotiations. At one time it was 
fashionable for the international press to portray the 
chief's enemies as ethnic enemies. The war in Natal has 
shown beyond doubt that ethnic Zulus are sharply 
divided, with a substantial proportion, perhaps even 
the majority, backing the ANC.
Buthelezi's Inkatha movement is best understood as a 
v a rie ty  o f m ach in e  p o lit ic s  ra th er than  eth n ic  
■ nationalism, despite its deployment of ethnic symbols. 
Pretoria imports Chicago economics to South Africa; 
-1 Buthelezi imports Chicago politics.
An analogy with the Mayor of Chicago is. not far­
fetched. The National Council of the political party 
, Inkatha so tightly intertwines with the Kwa Zulu Legis­
lative Assembly that the latter has been fairly said to be
-  'the legislative arm of Inkatha'. Public service jobs are 
in practice reserved for party members. Anyone who 
seeks a service or a favour find' it advisable to deal with 
Inkatha functionaries - just as in the old boss systems of 
American cities the first resort in times of need was the 
neighbourhood ward heeler. W ith so many party mem­
bers holding fulltime jobs on the public payroll it is not
hard to get up a crowd for a rally or a gang of sturdy 
youths to break up the meetings of rival organisations.
If Buthelezi is considered a market-place politician 
rather than a mouth-piece for Zulu conservatism or big 
business; some sense can be made of the ambiguities of 
Inkatha. He is as aware as anyone that the South African 
State exhibits every sign of terminal illness. If the sick 
giant is granted a miraculous remission, an organisa­
tion like Inkatha, which the regime must tolerate if it is 
to function at all in the bantustans, ensures Buthelezi 
continued power on the small stage of Kwa Zulu. If 
outside pressure or a deepened financial crisis within 
the state forces a renegotiation of the constitution along 
federal lines, Buthelezi has, until recently, held nearly 
all the cards in Natal. With a black constituency or­
ganisation that has proved it can deliver votes, and a
“Monetarist economic 
reform ignited the 
discontent in the 
townships”
growing reputation as the last, worst hope of local 
whites, he or his successor could emerge as the strong 
man of the region.
In a general smashup other possibilities might arise. 
Although Buthelezi appears long ago to have aban­
doned hope of winning a leading role in national 
politics, circumstances could change. A generation ago 
Moise Tshombe of Zaire was written off as a regional 
boss who could win no support outside his home base 
of Katanga. A few years later his connections with 
mining capital made him prime minister of the country. 
A more likely scenario for South Africa would be the 
d isintegration  of central authority follow ed by a 
unilateral declaration of independence by a Buthelezi- 
led government of regional unity in Natal. In that posi­
tion he would have the advantage of having already in 
place all the normal apparatus of a modem African 
government. A republic of Kwa Zulu would be more 
populous than 35 African countries and economically 
stronger than many of the others. Inkatha, whose con­
stitution was modelled on that of the Zambian United 
National Independence Party, would adapt readily to 
its predestined role in a one-party state. The party's 
economic philosophy of Ubunto-Botho which purports 
to mix 'African communalism with free enterprise' 
strongly resembles the mystifications propagated by
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dozens of African capitalist states stretching from 
M orocco to Zimbabwe. The in-house trade union, 
UWUSA, would oil the wheels of a corporatist state 
where it was the only legal workers' organ. Inkatha's 
Youth Brigades and Kwa Zulu police could become a 
defence force. None of President Buthelezi's many 
uniforms would occasion remark in any gathering of 
African leaders. Jomo Kenyatta, with his fly-whisk, 
funny hats and sundowner parties for white ranchers, 
perfected the use of ambiguous messages in Kenyan 
politics a long time ago and Buthelezi is simply one of 
many Africans who have profited from the study of his 
techniques.
However unlikely that scenario, it is useful to con­
template as a way of understanding Buthelezi's war on 
the ANC. If his object were simply to survive the present 
crisis with his entrenched privileges intact, there was no 
need to go into battle against the militants. He could, as 
he has done many times before, have provided rhetori­
cal support while giving no practical help. There are two 
other reasons which do make some sense. One was to 
project an image to the outside world of Buthelezi as a 
viable anti-communist alternative to white supremacy. 
The other was to protect and promote Inkatha's position 
as the sole black contender for power in every sphere of 
life, at least within Natal-Kwa Zulu. To followers of the 
UDF, who felt in their bones that this time it was really
- on, Buthelezi appeared the arch-traitor when he attack­
ed them rather than the state.
During the last few m onths Inkatha has suffered 
grievous reverses. Ju ly 's  ANC strike against the 
violence in Natal won widespread support in every part 
of the country, including Natal. PAC and Inkatha op­
position to the strike was totally ineffective. In June, 
Buthelezi lost his long-time lieutenant when Oscar 
Dhlomo defected to the ANC, saying he could not "see 
the Kwa Zulu government continuing to exist as an 
ethnic geopolitical entity". Thus, Buthelezi's goal has 
shifted from separatism to survival.
Events have now reached a critical pass. The ANC's 
black rivals are weaker than ever, but so are its external 
sources of support. De Klerk has bought time for his 
regime by sitting down to talk, but his economy is one 
’ of the world's notorious basket cases and any false 
move could precipitate a flight of capital. The detention 
last month of the ANC communist Maharaj may have 
been such a false move. Foreign bankers have now been 
led to believe that de Klerk can negotiate a settlement 
with the ANC that will save their investments. While a 
, few detentions may placate some to the right of white 
politics, they risk driving the ANC back into exile. That 
will destroy everything de Klerk has done since Decem­
ber to win friends in Europe and North America. 
Having released Mandela and unbanned the ANC he 
cannot turn back the clock.
[
The ANC's position is stronger but not invincible, as 
important sources of funding dry up. Some people see
the ANC divided on the subject of state ownership of 
mining and manufacturing industry. My own view dif­
fers and is based on a talk I heard given at the Royal 
African Society in London last October.
The speaker was Albie Sachs. As soon as he began to 
speak it was evident that he was floating trial balloons 
for the ANC. This was not the Albie Sachs of the Jail 
Diaries. He arrived in a jacket and tie, plainly ready to 
talk business. W hen he approached the program of 
nationalisation enshrined in ANC policy since the first 
promulgation of the Freedom Charter, he pointedly 
denied any intent to impose new management on the 
mining industry. "W e don't know how to run mines," 
he said, "and have no wish to do so." A little later, a man 
in the audience stood up and dramatically revealed 
himself as an executive of the Anglo-American mining
“Fear for the future of 
their capital and  
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follow de Klerk into 
unknown territory”
conglomerate. Expressing surprise at what he saw as an 
about-turn in the ANC stance, he went on to say that 
Anglo-American would be glad to do business with 
them on that basis.
Since that time the ANC has blown hot and cold on 
nationalisation. In January, Mandela was sticking to the 
Charter. In W ashington a few weeks ago he had 
reduced nationalisation to a holding of 20% or less in 
key enterprises. Arguably, what we are seeing is not a 
debate on state ownership in the ANC - whose leader­
ship is quite aware of what a flight of capital would 
mean to a post-apartheid regime - but a calculated use 
of nationalisation as a bargaining chip. Making conces­
sions now would take the heat off big capital and 
weaken the pressure that sector has been putting on de 
Klerk.
Likewise the armed struggle. There is nothing to be 
gained by dropping it just now.
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